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SUMMARY

GENERAL

- 1. Ambassador Kennan emphasizes importance of Soviet overture on Korea (page 3).
- 2. France and Britain now favor early meeting with USSR (page 3).

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3. Ambassador Chataigneau analyzes Soviet intentions toward Germany (page 4).

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4. 5.	President Rhee rejects UNCURK's compromise recommendation (page 5).	25X1
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GENERAL

1.	Ambassador Kennan emphasizes importance of Soviet overture on
	Korea:
25X1A	Assistant Secretary General Zinchenko's approach to an Israeli UN delegate suggesting a new formula for the Koreanarmistice negotiations is of major importance, in the opinion of Ambassador Kennan in Moscow. Zinchenko's suggestion appears aimed at a virtual cease-fire in Korea without final and formal agreement, the prisoner-of-war issue to be handled by an overt "agreement to disagree," and possibly by subsequent informal arrangements tending to minimize its importance.
	The Ambassador believes that any solution of the prisoner impasse would have to be along some such line as that suggested by Zinchenko.
	Comment: In addition to conveying a possible way around the prisoner-of-war impasse, the Soviet 'feeler" to the Israeli delegate could be another effort to bring UN pressure to bear upon the United States to modify its stand in Korea. Reportedly, the Russian suggestion has already been echoed in part by other delegations.
2.	France and Britain now favor early meeting with USSR:
25X1A	French Foreign Minister Schuman and British Foreign Secretary Eden now favor an early four-power meeting to discuss conditions for free elections in Germany and the status of an all-German government pending a peace treaty. Schuman, who considers that signature of the EDC treaty and the contractual agreement have considerably strengthened the Western position, thinks that such a meeting would satisfy the French public's desire for a final attempt at reaching an understanding with the Russians.
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Comment: The encouragement engendered by the signing of the Western accord with Germany apparently led Schuman and Eden to agree that a reply to the Russian note of 24 May should seek to end the exchange. Subsequent reappraisals of domestic

political pressures, however, have evidently influenced the French and British Foreign Ministers to revert to their earlier position in

SOVIET UNION

3. :	Ambassador	Chataigneau	analyzes	Soviet	intentions	toward	Germany
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favor of quadripartite talks.

The French Ambassador in Moscow believes that in an effort to prevent ratification of Germany's agreements with the West, the Soviet Union will intensify its campaign of intimidation and allow East Germany to take

initiatives endangering peace without involving the responsibility of the Soviet Government.

Having adopted this line of action, the Kremlin would have every advantage in declaring itself in favor of negotiation, which it would attempt to stall, and acting as if, in the words of Mr. Vyshinsky, "nothing has been changed by signing of the Bonn agreements."

Ambassador Chataigneau believes that through these tactics the USSR would encourage French and German resistance to Western policy, and if successful in preventing a European coalition, would strengthen the influence of American isolationists.

FAR EAST

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Approved For Release 2003/10/15: CIA-RDP79T00975A000700250001-6 25X1 President Rhee rejects UNCURK's compromise recommendation: President Rhee has reacted negatively to UNCURK's proposal of 7 June that a com-25X1A promise solution be found to the South Korean political dispute, according to the commission's At a meeting with the commission on 9 June, Rhee's only interest was to get his constitutional amendments adopted. his Prime Minister as reporting that the Assembly is "coming around" to his viewpoint. Ambassador Muccio comments that the statement allegedly made by the Prime Minister is not understandable in view of the fact that he had expressed doubt on 7 June that the Assembly opposition would be willing to compromise or capitulate. 6. 25X1 - 5 -25X1A

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7. Plot to overthrow Cambodian Government uncovered:

Cambodian Prime Minister Kanthoul informed the US Charge d' Affaires in Phnom Penh that he had uncovered a plot by a coalition of opposition political parties to overthrow his

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The Charge comments that although the plotters are not strong enough to overthrow the government by force, their threat of open rebellion is a "grave matter."

missariat personnel organized the conspiracy.

government.

Kanthoul claimed to possess evidence that French Com-

Comment: French officials in Indochina are known to be dissatisfied with the Kanthoul government, which has been increasingly insistent that French controls be relaxed. The Prime Minister's suspicion that the French engineered this plot against his government may further strain French-Cambodian relations.

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